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Abstract: 
Accounting regulation is a highly topical issue for listed companies in Europe. 
From 1 January 2005 all companies listed in the EU member states are required 
to produce financial reports compliant with international accounting standards. 
Financial reports will be comparable with each other only if full compliance with 
the international standards can be ensured. Historically, however, an enduring 
weakness of the international standard-setting regime has been its inability to 
enforce compliance with its standards. There is a danger that implementation 
and compliance will be variable across the adopting countries, and that deeply 
ingrained national reporting practices will persist. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine some distinctive elements of Spanish financial reporting practices.  
Spanish financial reporting by major companies demonstrates a tendency 
towards quite overt manipulation of the earnings figures. The research reported 
in the paper firstly identifies four common earnings manipulation practices, and   2 
then proceeds to examine their incidence in the financial statements of the IBEX-
35 companies over a three year period.    3 
Introduction 
 
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) came into being in 
1973 via an agreement by several leading national professional accountancy 
bodies. In the period between 1973 and 2001 it grew in status, authority and 
membership. In the furtherance of its objectives it published many accounting 
standards and its status increased to the point where, by 2001 it was poised to 
become the de facto supranational standard-setter for much of the world. A key 
point was gained with the agreement, in 1995, with the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) that the IASC would be responsible for 
developing a set of ‘core standards’. If these were agreed by IOSCO, they would 
be endorsed for use in all global markets; the endorsement took place in 2000.  
 
In 2000, the IASC decided to alter its constitution; from 2001 the standard setting 
body was reconstituted as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 
to be responsible for issuing International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
At the time of writing six IFRSs have been issued, but the IASB is in the process 
of addressing some highly complex technical accounting issues that will, in due 
course, result in the issue of more standards.  
 
In 2001 the European Commission decided to present legislation to require the 
adoption of international accounting standards by the listed companies of all 
member states from 2005 onwards. Similar arrangements will shortly come into   4 
operation in Australia and New Zealand
i. It can be expected that national 
standard setting bodies around the world will gradually become less important, 
and may in due course cease to exist. The most significant national standard 
setter of all is, of course, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and, 
until recently, it appeared that US standard setting might proceed autonomously 
without much regard to the activities of the IASB. However, a convergence 
project between the in the USA and IASB was launched in the autumn of 2003, 
and some significant movement towards convergence has already taken place.  
 
One of the most significant developments of recent times has been that the 
IASC/B has moved away from the objective of ‘harmonisation’ of regulations, and 
towards an ultimate goal of global standardisation. If such standardisation is to 
be achieved it is likely to be through a combination of means. As noted above, 
the EU will adopt international accounting standards from listed companies from 
2005 onwards. Some countries within the EU will permit or require adoption by all 
companies (included non listed). Even where they are not formally adopted for all 
companies within a member state, they are likely to have a pervasive effect by 
influencing national regulators. The process of convergence with US standards 
will take longer and is much more uncertain in its effects. It may not ultimately 
pervade all aspects of regulation. Nevertheless it is not overstating the case to 
suppose that the ultimate goal is one of standardising accounting regulation 
across the world. ‘Harmonisation’ constituted a broad church, permissive of a 
substantial level of national difference in regulation. A global approach to   5 
standard setting, however, requires a much greater level of agreement between 
national representatives, and will require much greater rigour to ensure 
compliance. 
 
Accounting in Spain – some background 
 
 
Up till the present day, substantial differences have continued to exist between 
the accounting regulatory regimes of different countries, despite the move 
towards international harmonisation (Street et al. 2000). Differences tend to 
persist in areas such as asset valuation, revenue and expense recognition and 
measurement, depreciation and amortisation, recognition of provisions and 
liabilities, accounting for stock options, foreign currency, derivatives and 
discounting. The reconciliation to US GAAP of those Spanish companies that are 
listed in both Madrid and New York is illustrative of the degree of difference. 
Table 1 shows 2001 data for all seven companies in this category. In all cases, 
earnings under US GAAP are lower than under Spanish accounting regulation. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Within Spanish GAAP, as elsewhere, there is a great deal of scope for variation 
within reported results (Lainez et al., 1999). For example, in valuing inventories 
Spanish accounting regulation currently permits the adoption of average cost, 
FIFO or LIFO. The differences in reporting profits can be substantial depending 
upon which policy is selected by management.    6 
 
However, there are some unusual features of the Spanish accounting 
environment that merit special attention. First, audit report qualifications are 
common, even in respect of major listed companies. Acerete Gil et al (2002) find 
that between in the years 1996-2000 the number of qualified audit opinions in the 
financial statements of listed Spanish companies fell but the number was still 
high in 2000 when 92 companies had audit qualifications. The Comisión Nacional 
del Mercado de Valores (the Spanish equivalent of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission – CNMV) reports that in 2002 109 listed companies filed financial 
statements containing a qualified audit report (this figure represents 16.1% of the 
total number – 676 – of listed company filings). The number of audit report 
qualifications had, in fact, increased by 15.9% over the comparable figure in 
2001.  
 
Second, a feature which is likely to elicit some surprise outside Spain, an 
element of earnings management may be carried out with the collusion of the 
regulatory authorities. Supervising agencies may permit individual companies to 
adopt an accounting policy which contravenes current accounting regulation. 
Such authorisations are provided as a result of effective lobbying by either a 
company or representative companies within an industrial sector. Successful 
lobbying of this type demonstrates the power of influence that the business 
sector may have over government or its agencies. For example, the Spanish 
Central Bank has occasionally authorised a bank experiencing commercial   7 
difficulties, to disapply GAAP relating to provisions for bad debts. Also, during 
times of currency devaluation, the Spanish accounting regulatory body (ICAC) 
authorised certain companies (for example, utilities) to derecognise exchange 
losses. The practice of charging expenses to reserves rather than to the income 
statement may also be permitted.  
 
Several leading Spanish authorities have recently expressed their view that 
major accounting scandals, of the type that have occurred in the last two or three 
years in the USA, are unlikely to occur in Spain. However, this view can be 
challenged. Jimenez and Abril (2002) have identified several instances of 
Spanish listed companies with significant accounting problems. For example: 
 
•  Failing to account fully for the consequences of serious risks, especially 
those arising from exposure in Latin America (e.g. Teléfonica, Teléfonica 
Móviles, Repsol, Aguas de Barcelona and Aurea). 
 
•  Charging expenses to reserves (BBVA and BSCH) 
 
•  Overstatement of net income (Sol Meliá and Campofrio) 
 
•  Classification of extraordinary profits as income arising from ordinary 
activities (Unión Fenosa) 
   8 
•  Failure to provide full information resulting in a limitation of audit scope 
(Pescanova, EADS, Avanzit, Funespaña and Urbas). 
 
Regulatory agencies responsible for policing the implementation of accounting 
regulation are often accused in Spain of deliberately ignoring obvious cases of 
rule infringement (for example, see Pérez, 2002).  
 
The research study 
 
The objective of this study is to examine some of the distinctive features of 
Spanish financial reporting. Specifically, we identify the extent of certain earnings 
manipulation practices in large listed Spanish companies. It should be noted that 
the type of earnings manipulation identified in this article is relatively overt, and 
almost certainly legal under current Spanish regulation. Outside the scope of the 
study, therefore, are all those categories of manipulative behaviour in relation to 
earnings that are hidden and cannot readily be discerned by an informed and 
skilled observer.  
 
The following occurrences have been classified for the purposes of this study as 
possible indicators of earnings management: 
 
•  Auditor report qualifications (in Spain there is no requirement to restate 
the financial statements to reflect the effect of the qualifications. The effect 
is, however, noted in the audit report). 
   9 
•  Special authorisations from regulatory agencies to adopt non-standard 
policy 
 
•  Changes in accounting policy from one year to another (in Spain, such 
changes have to be explained and the consequences quantified in the 
auditor’s report). 
 
•  Existence of extraordinary results and prior period adjustments in the 
income statement 
The sample of companies comprises the 35 companies included in the Madrid 
Stock Exchange’s IBEX-35 index. These are the largest companies in Spain and 
are likely to account for a significant proportion of the total movement of funds in 
and out of the Spanish capital market. The annual reports of the 35 companies 
were thoroughly scrutinised over a three year period from 1999 to 2001 in order 
to identify instances of the four possible indicators of earnings management. The 
incidence and impact of special authorisations, audit report qualifications and 
extraordinary items are easy to identify in an annual report. Analysis of any 
changes in accounting policy are also easy to identify (from information included 
in the audit report) but require careful consideration as to whether or not they are 
likely to constitute earnings management behaviour. Audit report information was 
considered in conjunction with detailed analysis of the notes to the financial 
statements in determining whether or not the changes in policy could be 
categorised as earnings management behaviour.   10 
 
Accounting policies were compared both with those policies adopted in previous 
years, and with those adopted by competitors in order to assess whether or not 
an individual company’s policies were out of line with those generally adopted in 




The analysis of the results is presented in two sections. First, we examine the 
aggregate effects on reported earnings of the IBEX-35 of the four categories of 
potential manipulation. Second, we examine the effects on reported earnings of 
audit report qualifications, special authorisations and changes in accounting 
policy in three consecutive years from 1999-2001. 
 
The analysis separates the effects of, on the one hand, audit report 
qualifications, special authorisations and changes in accounting policy, and, on 
the other hand, extraordinary items. This is because the first three categories 
point much more clearly towards manipulation of earnings behaviour. The 
existence of extraordinary items, however, is more ambiguous; they may indicate 
an attempt at classificatory smoothing, but may be quite genuinely extraordinary 
(within the definition offered by Spanish accounting regulation). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to examine the nature of the extraordinary items but their   11 
effect on net earnings is reported here as being worthy of note for two principal 
reasons: 
 
•  The sheer incidence of extraordinary items in the financial statements 
reviewed.  
•  The preponderance of extraordinary expenses compared to extraordinary 
income. 
 
Table 2 shows the effects of all four categories of potential earnings 
management behaviour on the consolidated financial statements of the IBEX-35 
companies. The upper part of the table identifies the effects of audit report 
qualifications, special authorisations and changes in accounting policy. The 
financial statements of twelve of the 35 groups of companies (over one-third) 
contained at least one instance of these effects, and in two cases (BBVA and 
BSCH – both banks – there were two instances). The lower part of the table 
demonstrates the level and effect of extraordinary income and expenses on the 
reporting earnings.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 shows the aggregate effect on reported earnings across the IBEX-35. 
Two companies experienced auditor qualifications, three had special 
authorisations and five had changes in accounting policy suggestive of earnings   12 
management. Adjusted earnings for the nine companies are some 22% lower 
than reported earnings once the effects of these adjustments are taken into 
account. The effect of extraordinary items is striking; at the individual company 
level extraordinary expenses are far higher than extraordinary income.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Finally, the impact of earnings management on reported earnings was assessed 
for each of the three financial years in the 1999-2001 period. The aggregate 
impact on earnings of three categories (audit report qualifications, special 
authorisations and changes in accounting policy) was assessed and an adjusted 
net earnings figure was calculated. (Note that, for this purpose, and for the 
reasons explained earlier, extraordinary items were excluded from the analysis). 
The difference between reported and adjusted net earnings is expressed as a 
percentage for each of the companies concerned in Table 3.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
It may be noted that in 1999, a year when the economy was in a relatively 
buoyant condition, the reported earnings of 9 firms were less than adjusted 
earnings. However, in 2000 and 2001 when the Spanish economy was affected 
by an economic downturn, the position is reversed. A clear majority of the   13 
companies under scrutiny in both years showed reported earnings higher than 
adjusted earnings.  
 
In Spain, both individual financial statements and consolidated financial 
statements are published. The reported analysis covers the reported earnings at 
the individual financial statement level. However, the analysis was also 
conducted on the consolidated financial statements, twelve of which (out of 35) 
were found to contain auditor qualifications, special authorisations or changes in 
accounting policy specified in the notes. Three of the twelve named groups of 
companies had been granted special authorisations (all are banking institutions). 
Six out of the twelve had qualified audit reports; the nature of the qualification is 
briefly summarised in the table. Five of the groups of companies reported 
changes in accounting policy that can be construed as potential earnings 
management behaviour. 
 
Taking these three categories of item into account, consolidated net earnings of 
the twelve named groups are reduced by 22%. The impact on the aggregated 
consolidated earnings of the IBEX-35 for 2001 is a reduction of 10%.  
 
Discussion of the implications 
 
All of the earnings management behaviours identified in this study have been 
identified through careful analysis of the financial statements. Some of the   14 
manifestations are easier to identify than others, but all should be observable by 
a reasonably well-informed user of the financial statements. The question may be 
asked: if the earnings management behaviour is so obvious, can it properly be 
classified as earnings management at all? However, the extent to which users of 
the statements actually do observe such relatively clear examples of earnings 
management is uncertain
ii. It has been observed that analysts’ reports in Spain 
usually fail to mention the existence of audit report qualifications, special 
authorisations or other manifestations of earnings management practices, and 
that analysts have very short memories where such matters are concerned 
(Expansión Directo, 2002). Even quite clear signalling can be misinterpreted or 
ignored even by relatively sophisticated users (Breton and Taffler, 1995). 
Furthermore, Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that even if financial statements 
provide sufficient information to permit users to adjust for earnings management, 
there would still be cause for concern over the value of the information content 
because of ‘the possibility that certain investors rely completely on earnings 
numbers reported on the face of the income statement because their ability to 
process more sophisticated (i.e. footnote) information is limited’.  
 
The results of the research show that some element of overt earnings 
management practice is common in large Spanish companies. The unusually 
high incidence of audit report qualifications identified by Acerete Gil et al. (2002) 
and the CNMV suggests that corporate management commonly takes the 
decision to overstate or understate net earnings even at the expense of a report   15 
qualification. In some cases, this may be because managers genuinely feel that 
their own presentation provides a fairer view. However, it appears in practice that 
many audit report qualifications relate simply to disagreement over the adequacy 
of discretionary accruals elements.  
 
The results of the study over a three year time period suggest that the direction 
of earnings management could be related to general economic conditions. (This 
possibility was flagged by Merchant (1990)).  
 
From 2005, Spanish listed companies, in common with all others in the European 
Union, will be obliged to report under international accounting standards. A 
decision has been taken in Spain to extend this reporting requirement to all 
unlisted companies by 2007. This change will be effected by altering the Spanish 
PGC to achieve compliance with international standards. Future compliance with 
international accounting standards in Spain will therefore depend upon at least 
two factors: 
 
1.  The extent to which international accounting standards are properly and 
thoroughly incorporated into the PGC.  
2.  The persistence with which overt manipulative behaviours will persist 
amongst Spanish financial statement preparers.  
   16 
 It appears that Spanish corporate managers are accustomed to (often) large-
scale accounting manipulation, and the change of regulatory regime may not 
necessarily alter behaviour. As demonstrated in this study regulatory agencies 
were quite prepared to offer dispensations from compliance to effective lobbyists 
in 2001; it may be reasonable to suppose that lobbying in the Spanish 
environment will continue to produce successful outcomes for the lobbyists.  
 
Limitations and suggestions for further work 
 
The study reported in this paper has some clear limitations. The analysis has 
been limited only to those earnings management practices that can be easily 
identified from published financial statements. From an agency theoretical 
perspective, it might be expected that managers would attempt, as far as 
possible, to conceal such practices. Agency theoretical considerations suggest 
that we might expect, with a reasonable degree of confidence, that deliberately 
concealed earnings management behaviour also takes place. 
 
A further limitation should be recognised in respect of the sample of companies 
selected for examination. While the IBEX-35 companies are certainly significant 
to the Spanish economy, they may not be representative of it. On the one hand, 
they are more profoundly affected by developments and improvements in 
corporate governance, but on the other hand, they are under greater pressure 
from analysts to report within certain parameters.    17 
 
The study suggests opportunities for further research: 
1. It would be possible to extend the analysis further to cover both a longer time 
period and a larger number of companies. Further research of the type pioneered 
in the USA by, for example, McNichols and Wilson (2988), applying discretionary 
accruals models to large financial data sets in order to identify the extent of 
covert earnings management, could be undertaken in Spain.  
2. It is clear from the evidence presented in this paper that extraordinary items 
are frequently encountered features of Spanish financial reporting. This paper 
has not attempted detailed analysis of these items, and it could be a fruitful area 
for further research.  
3. The impact upon Spanish analysts and other key financial statement users of 
the overt earnings management behaviour discussed in this paper is under-
explored. Further research is needed to identify the extent to which users of 
Spanish listed companies’ financial statements are capable, in practice, of 
identifying the earnings management features discussed in the paper. 
4. The transition to international standards in 2005 provides an opportunity to 
chart the extent of changes in reporting practice under the new regime. A 
detailed analysis of the extent to which international financial reporting standards 
are reflected in the new model of the PGC would be of great assistance to users 
of financial statements both within and outside Spain. 
 
Conclusions   18 
This paper has quantified the extent of certain types of earnings management 
upon the largest Spanish companies. The availability and potential impact of 
special authorisations to avoid certain regulatory provisions is likely to be of 
particular interest to a non-Spanish readership. The high incidence of audit report 
qualifications is also an unusual feature of interest. It can be concluded that 
relatively overt forms of earnings management do take place amongst several 
leading Spanish companies. The nature and extent of this phenomenon should 
be of interest to the Spanish regulators of accounting. In the interests of 
promoting high-quality, transparent accounting reports, the transition to 
international financial reporting standards via a remodelled PGC should be of 
particular interest to observers.  
 
It may be observed that tightening reporting rules is not, in itself, sufficient to alter 
behaviour. Deeply ingrained manipulative behaviour may well persist beyond 
2005. Improving standards in one area tends simply to shift the location of 
earnings management. In Spain, remedial measures should also include 
improvements in supervision. On a sub-regulatory level, analysts could 
encourage better standards of reporting by explicitly including more information 
in their reports on overt earnings management practices.  
 
Finally, individuals, managers and organisations relying upon financial reports 
should be aware of the possibility of persistent national reporting characteristics 
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Table 1: Net income of seven Spanish companies under Spanish and 
US GAAP (all figures in million Euros) 
Year: 2001 
 





BBVA  +2,363  +680  +1,683 
Endesa  +1,479  +1,034  +445 
SCH  +2,486  +2,176  +310 
Repsol  +1,025  +980  +45 
Telefónica  +2,106  -7,182  +9,288 
Telefónica Móviles  +893  +320  +573 
Terra  -566  -11,411  +10,845 
Total  +9,786  -13,403  +23,189 
   22 
Table 2: Effects of auditors’ qualifications, changes in accounting policy, 
special authorisations and extraordinary items on net earnings of IBEX-35 
  Total 
(millions 
of Euros) 
Net reported earnings A  6,990 
Auditor qualifications B  -71 
Investment adjustment charged against retained earnings   
Goodwill amortisation charged against retained earnings   
Special authorisations C  -948 
Changes in accounting policy specified in the notes D  54 
Subtotal E = A +/- B +/- C +/- D  6,025 
%age change in net earnings =  
E – A  x 100 
     A 
-14% 
Extraordinary income F  -3,673 
Extraordinary expenses G  8,257 
Adjusted net earnings H = E + F + G  10,609 
%age change in net earnings after adjusting for extraordinary 
items = 
H - A   x 100  
   A 
+52% 
   23 
 
Table 3: Differences (%) between reported and adjusted net earnings in the 
IBEX-35 between 1999 and 2001  
Company  1999  2000  2001 
Acciona      -92% 
Acerinox  +3%  +1%   
Alba  +5%  +2%   
Acesa  -3%  -3%   
BBVA  -14%  -58%  -36% 
BSCH  -74%  -44%  -28% 
Bankinter  +2%     
Carrefour  +11%  +7%  +6% 
Dragados  +13%  -10%  +9% 
Endesa  +2%  -219%   
Gamesa    -952%  -153% 
Gas Natural      -1% 
Iberdrola  -21%  -74%   
Indra  +3%  +9%   
Popular      -13% 
Prisa    +14%   
Red Eléctrica  -2%  -3%  -4% 
Sol Meliá    -73%   
Telepizza    -252%     24 
Telefónica  +10%     
Unión Fenosa  +37%  -15%   
       
Number of 
companies 








9  5  2 
 
                                                  
i In the case of Australia, the Australian Financial Reporting Council announced on 3 July 2002 
that it would recommend that from 1 January 2005 the accounting standards applicable to 
companies would be those issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (FRC, 
2002). In New Zealand the Accounting Standards Review Board has recommended to the 
government that International Financial Reporting Standards should be adopted by entities in 
both the private and public sectors from 1 January 2007, with the option to adopt as early as 1 
January 2005 (ASRB, 2002). 
ii It is interesting in this context to note that, when an earlier version of this paper was reported in 
the press in Spain, some of the named companies responded very indignantly to their 
identification as managers of earnings. This may, of course, be a natural reaction common with 
any type of adverse publicity, but it could also indicate that company managers do not wish to 
have the nature and extent of earnings management made public, and suggests the possibility 
that they may regard it as information that has hitherto been hidden. 